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WHEN WORLDS COLLIDE: FEDERAL CONSTRUCTION OF  
STATE INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE^
by Marcia L. McCormick
I. INTRODUCTION 
In the 70s there was an . . . anti-war slogan:  
 "What if they held a war and nobody came?"  
 The contemporary . . . counterpart to this would be 
 "What if we staged a revolution and nobody noticed?"1
It turns out that the Supreme Court has staged a federalism revolution, but 
nobody has noticed.  Well, actually, many have noticed that some kind of 
revolution is happening, but few can make much sense of it and nearly everyone 
has missed a piece that is revolutionary in its own right.2 Focusing on recent 
cases restricting Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause and the Tenth 
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1This statement appeared on the blog, “Simply Appalling: A Jaundiced Eye on the 
News”on May 16, 2005 as part of a post on right-wing revolutions and nuclear weapons.  
http://simplyappalling.blogspot.com/2005/05/second-american-revolution-goes.html (May 16, 
2005). The original anti-war slogan is probably derived from a poem by Carl Sandberg, who 
wrote, “[s]ometime they’ll give a war and nobody will come.” Carl Sandberg, The People, Yes 
(1936). The sentiment has undergone a number of permutations in service of various goals, and 
this permutation seemed appropriate to this topic. 
2Erwin Chemerinsky, Understanding the Rehnquist Court: An Admiring Reply to 
amendment, and the Supreme Court’s power under the Eleventh Amendment, 
many commentators have argued that the Court is building up state power at the 
expense of the national government.3 But at the same time that it has expanded 
state power in these areas, the Supreme Court has expanded national power at the 
expense of the states in others.4 One of these expansions has been in the amount 
of deference the Court seems willing to grant state court interpretations of state 
law. And the method of this expansion lies in the Court’s imposition of federal 
separation of powers principles on state governments. In two cases in recent 
years, the Supreme Court differentiated between the branches of government at 
the state level to justify a refusal to defer to the state courts.  It had never done so 
before. By relying on a seemingly neutral federal principle, the Court hid the 
aggrandizement of power to itself. 
 The first case we are all familiar with, and in fact are probably weary of: 
Bush v. Gore, in which the Supreme Court ordered an end to a recount of ballots 
cast in the 2000 presidential election.5 Justice Rehnquist’s concurring opinion 
argued that the Florida Supreme Court’s interpretation of state law should be 
rejected; because the United States Supreme Court delegated the power to design 
elections to the legislatures of the states, the Court had a duty to ensure that the 
 
Professor Merrill, 47 ST. LOUIS UNIV. L. J. 659 (2003). 
3E.g. Vicki C. Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional 
Experience, 51 DUKE L.J. 223, 234-41 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives]; Vicki C. Jackson, 
Seductions of Coherence, State Sovereign Immunity and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 
RUTGERS L.J. 691, 699 (2000) [hereinafter, Jackson, Seductions]; see Thomas W. Merrill, The 
Making of the Second Rehnquist Court: A Preliminary Analysis, 47 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 569, 570-71 
(2003) (summarizing the main critiques). 
4See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 659; Ruth Colker & James Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 
MICH. L. REV. 80, 84 (2001); Merrill, supra note 3, at 569. 
5531 U.S. 98, 105-11 (2000).  
state judicial branch was faithful to the will of the state legislative branch.6 He 
explained that given this federal constitutional duty, the review and rejection of 
the state court interpretation of state law “does not imply a disrespect for state 
courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally prescribed role of state 
legislatures.”7 A flurry of scholarly contributions debated the propriety of not 
deferring to the state court’s interpretation of state law, but none addressed the 
court’s construction of state separation of powers in a systematic way.8
That flurry over the concurrence may have been much ado about nothing 
except that three years later, to no fanfare, a unanimous court, deciding a 
mundane equal protection challenge to a state tax, rejected an interpretation of 
state law by a state supreme court, stating that “the Constitution grants legislators, 
not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide whom they 
wish to help with their . . . laws and how much help those laws ought to 
provide.”9 In other words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme Court 
 
6Id. at 111-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
7Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
8Louise Weinberg did discuss the issue in these terms, but devoted only a small portion of 
her article to the issue, and instead, focused primarily on the fact that the Court decided the 
outcome of the election, arguing that action was an unconstitutional aggrandizement of power.  
Louise Weinberg, When Courts Decide Elections: The Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. 
L. REV. 609, 625-27 (2002). Additionally, Professor Mark Tushnet wrote that Vicki Jackson 
suggested this separation of powers issue in an e-mail to him in 2001.  Renormalizing Bush v. 
Gore: An Anticipatory Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L. J. 113, 124 n.64 (2001). 
9Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 108 (2003). At issue was a tax 
on the proceeds of slot machines at the state’s racetracks and riverboats; these proceeds were the 
primary source of revenue for both types of gaming establishment. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. 
Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002). At the state’s horse and dog racetracks, slot 
machine proceeds were taxed at a maximum of thirty-six percent, while at the state’s riverboats, 
they were taxed at a maximum of twenty percent. Iowa Code §99F.4A(6), 99F.11 (2003).  Finding 
that the proceeds were similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court then found the scheme 
deferred to the state legislature. To date, this case, Fitzgerald v. Racing 
Association of Central Iowa has not even been a blip on the radar screen of 
federalism scholars. 
 Fitzgerald is representative of cases the federal courts routinely encounter 
where they are asked to consider an issue of state law.  That a state court had 
already analyzed the law at issue does not make this case much more unusual.  In 
every one of those cases, the federal courts must decide whether to defer to the 
state court analysis and, if so, how much.  The federal courts will often defer, but 
many times have not done so, and they rarely explain the reasons for the 
departures they make.  This article explores the reasoning behind the courts’ 
decisions about deference and endeavors to provide some guidance for when the 
federal courts should defer to state court pronouncements of state law.   
 More specifically, part two of this article illustrates the lines of authority 
on deference for different types of state statutory questions. Part three then 
suggests the principles that underlie this distinction, and part four proposes 
guidelines for the federal courts to use in analyzing these problems. 
 I submit that when the federal courts defer to a particular branch of state 
 
irrational because the tax frustrated the purpose of the act creating it. Racing Ass’n of Central 
Iowa, 648 N.W.2d at 561. The purpose found by Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the state’s 
racing industry, in an effort to make an unprofitable venture profitable again. Id. at 560. Taxing 
the proceeds at the race tracks at a rate so much higher than that of the riverboats damaged that 
profitability, defeating the purpose of the act. Id. at 560-61, 562. Before the Iowa Supreme Court, 
the state argued that the purpose of the act was to encourage economic growth and promote 
agriculture. Id. at 560. The court found that even if this were the purpose of the act, this purpose 
too was frustrated by the higher tax rate on racetracks. Id. at 561. 
 The race tracks argued that when the Iowa Supreme Court determined what the purpose 
of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpretation deserved the deference 
that is almost always accorded state supreme court declarations of state law. Transcript of Oral 
Argument at 26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103 (Apr. 29, 2003) (No. 
02-695). In other words, that interpretation was binding on the United States Supreme Court. 
Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).  
government at the expense of another branch, they risk infringing very seriously 
on state sovereignty.  The power of the federal courts to review acts of Congress 
is a constitutional power.  Similarly, the power of state courts to review acts of 
state legislatures is a matter of state constitutional power.  Where the federal 
constitution explicitly grants state legislatures particular powers or where the state 
court’s actions seem designed to evade judicial review or frustrate a federal right, 
the federal courts are on relatively solid ground not deferring to the state courts.  
Conversely, where the federal constitution treats the states as unitary entities and 
where there is no indications the state courts are working to undermine an 
important federal interest, the federal courts have little justification to exercise 
independent review of state law.  Not deferring runs the risk of dictating what 
state constitutional law should be.  And that result could nullify the power of the 
people within the states to define their government and to define their individual 
rights in a way more generous than that of the federal constitution. 
 II. FEDERAL COURT APPROACHES TO STATE LAW 
The framers of our constitution are thought to have created our federal 
system of government to diffuse power in order to guarantee the maximum 
amount of individual freedom.10 The courts tend to treat our system of federalism 
as dual, creating two judicial tracks, whose judges have competence over distinct 
subjects.11 Federal courts are considered to have greater competence over federal 
 
10MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 4, 25 (1995); Robert 
A. Schapiro, Interjurisdictional Enforcement of Rights in a Post-Erie World, 46 WM & MARY L. 
REV. 1399, 1401 (2005). 
 11Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 Iowa L. Rev. 243, 
246, 294 (2005) (describing and critiquing the theoretical model of dual federalism and its 
perpetuation by courts). 
law, and state courts, greater competence over state law.12 This notion of dual 
sovereignty suggests a particular division of labor with regard to legal issues.  
Federal claims and federal issues should be heard by federal courts, and state 
claims and state issues should be heard by state courts. 
 But the world does not divide up quite so nicely, and there is significant 
overlap of state and federal issues. So, for example, state courts are often called 
upon to decide issues of federal law.13 State court competence over federal law is 
not entirely surprising, because state courts are courts of general jurisdiction, and, 
bound by the Supremacy Clause, not only are able to decide federal questions, but 
have a duty to do so.14 Of course, that competence notwithstanding, scholars 
 
12MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION : TENSION IN THE ALLOCATION OF 
JUDICIAL POWER 2-3 (2d ed. 1990); Barry Friedman, Under the Law of Federal Jurisdiction: 
Allocating Cases between Federal and State Courts, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 1211, 1236 (2004); 
Schapiro, supra note 10, at 1409; see also Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal 
Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 605, 607 (1982); Philip P. Kurland, Toward a 
Cooperative Judicial Federalism: The Federal Court Abstention Doctrine, 24 F.R.D. 481 487 
(1960). 
 13In fact, given how few cases the United States Supreme Court hears, the states have 
become important guardians of federal interests. See Friedman, supra note 12, at 1218-20; Robert 
R. Pushaw, Jr., Bridging the Enforcement Gap in Constitutional Law: A Critique of the Supreme 
Court’s Theory that Self-Restraint Promotes Federalism, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1289, 1289, 
1304 (2005); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-First 
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 350-53 (2002). 
 14See, e.g., Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 443 (1977) (quoting Steffel v. 
Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460-61 (1974)); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1946) (holding that state 
courts may not discriminate against federal claims but have a duty to hear them); cf. Alden v. 
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that this duty is simply not to discriminate, but that the states 
are not required to hear federal claims if they do not entertain similar state claims); see also 
Michael G. Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 
WIS. L. REV. 39, 49-52, 161-70 (analyzing state court obligations not to discriminate against 
federal claims). 
disagree on whether state courts can adequately protect federal interests.15 
As accepted as the notion of state court competence over federal issues is, 
federal courts seem less competent to decide state law issues. The mantra of 
modern federalism is that the federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction and 
may only exercise the jurisdiction that the constitution or a federal statute grants. 
Thus, our first instinct might to be to say that the federal courts should never 
decide issues of state law.16 
That approach, however, is not required by the text or structure of the 
constitution.17 The constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to 
“all Cases, in Law and Equity arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the 
United States, and Treaties [and] . . . to Controversies” between certain parties.18 
Moreover, the appellate power of the Supreme Court extends “both as to Law and 
 
15Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977); see also e.g. Bator, 
supra note 12; Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Parity Debate, 71 B.U. L. REV. 593, 599 (1991); 
Erwin Chemerinsky, Parity Reconsidered: Defining a Role for the Federal Judiciary, 36 UCLA L. 
REV. 233 (1988); Michael E. Solimine & James L. Walker, Constitutional Litigation in Federal 
and State Courts: An Empirical Analysis of Judicial Parity, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 213, 214 
(1983). 
 16See Schapiro, supra note 10, at 1426-28. 
 17Many scholars have described the way that the federal and state governments actually 
work together as “cooperative” federalism, which is not really a normative theory, but simply a 
description of voluntary activity. E.g. Daniel J. Elazar, Cooperative Federalism, in COMPETITION 
AMONG STATES AND LOCAL GOVERNMENTS: EFFICIENCY AND EQUITY IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM 
65, 80-83 (Daphne A. Kenyon & John Kincaid eds., 1991); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Cooperative Federalism: Why State Autonomy Makes Sense and “Dual Sovereignty” 
Doesn’t, 96 MICH. L. REV. 813 (1998). John Kincaid has argued that cooperative federalism was 
replaced by coercive federalism, where the federal government has used more coercive regulatory 
tools, preempting state authority and presenting the states with unfunded mandates, in the late 
1970s. John Kincaid, From Cooperative to Coercive Federalism, 509 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 139 (1990). 
 18U.S. CONST. art. III § 2. 
to Fact.”19 By empowering the judicial branch to decide all cases and particular 
controversies and by defining the appellate power as allowing de novo review, the 
constitution gives the judicial branch the power to decide every issue, whether of 
fact or law, whether state or federal, as long as that issue is contained in a case or 
controversy that would fall within Article III’s limits.20 Thus, under the 
constitution’s terms, the federal courts likely have the power to not only to 
consider issues of state law, but to decide them without deferring to state court 
constructions of that law.21 
Not only does the text of the constitution allow the federal courts a broad 
reach to decide state law issues, the structure of the constitution also demonstrates 
that state and federal governance overlap significantly. The federal government 
and the states share competence to legislate in many areas. While some categories  
 
19Id.
20That is not to say that there are no constitutional limits on the review of facts found at 
the trial-court level. The Seventh Amendment explicitly limits those facts a federal appellate court 
can review, and the Due Process clause may also provide some limit. See Henry P. Monaghan, 
Constitutional Fact Review, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 229, 234 (1985). Additionally, the adequate and 
independent state ground doctrine, which provides that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction over 
a case that presents a federal question if the judgment could be wholly supported on the outcome 
of a state law issue, may have constitutional foundations. If the Supreme Court’s reversal of the 
judgment would have no effect on the result, since the state court could issue the same judgment 
on the state law grounds. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 126 (1945). The Supreme Court’s 
decision would be an advisory opinion. Id.; see also Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the 
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 Am. U.L. Rev. 1053 (1999) (arguing that 
the adequate and independent state law doctrine is a part of Article III’s standing requirement that 
the injury be redressable). It is difficult to see, though, how what happened in Fitzgerald v. Racing 
Association of Central Iowa, where the state did just that on remand, would not be an advisory 
opinion in the same way. But see Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1039-40 & n.4 (1983) 
(detailing the circumstances in which the Court will take jurisdiction even though the judgment 
could be sustained on state grounds where those grounds are not clearly the actual grounds relied 
on, not truly adequate, or not truly independent). 
 21Monaghan, supra note 20; Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-
are truly reserved to the states, like a general police power, and some are granted 
exclusively to the federal government, like the power to grant patents, these 
categories grow ever fewer as our society changes, and more conduct transcends 
state boundaries.  
 Because of an overlap of federal and state law, the federal courts 
encounter state law questions in a number of ways.22 The most obvious way is 
when the federal court is sitting in diversity.23 Federal courts also encounter state 
 
Court Determinations of State Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919 (2003). 
 22See Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, 337-47, 358-59 ( ) (Story, J.) (considering 
the federal courts’ power under Article III to review the judgments of state courts and to examine 
issues of state law). 
 I use “federal courts” here to encompass the Supreme Court and the lower federal courts. 
At this point, distinguishing between the two would only confuse the general introduction 
provided in this section. However, the distinction has implications for analysis, but the end result 
may be the same. 
 On review of state court decisions, the Supreme Court will encounter state law issues that 
the state’s highest court has just interpreted in this particular factual context. Conversely, in the 
lower federal courts and in the Supreme Court on review of those courts’ decisions, the state law 
issues may or may not have been interpreted in a state forum, and will most likely not have been 
applied to the precise context the court is considering.  
 It would seem that if the federal court at issue is reviewing a state court interpretation 
formed in the case before it, then the federal court should exercise more deference to the state 
court’s judgment.  On the other hand, if the federal court is considering an interpretation of state 
law issued in a separate factual context, there may be even less reason to suspect the state court of 
interpreting the law so as to evade federal review, see infra note 162 and accompanying text, 
which would also suggest that there is less reason not to defer. 
 23The constitution grants the federal courts jurisdiction over “[c]ontroversies . . . between 
[c]itizens of different [s]tates.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. Congress gave that jurisdiction to the 
lower federal courts, as well. 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 
 Congress has provided that state law will provide the rules of decision in civil actions in 
“cases where they apply” unless a treaty, federal law, or the constitution requires otherwise. 28 
U.S.C. § 1652. The federal courts once fashioned general federal common law in diversity cases. 
Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The Court interpreted the rules of decision act as 
requiring the application only of state positive law, and not state common law. Id. at 12-13, 18-19. 
One reason for the Court’s holding was its view that uniform federal common law would facilitate 
commercial transactions, and the development of the law would serve as a model for states to 
adopt. Id. at 19. Additionally, the Court viewed the creation of common law as the divination of 
law claims when exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims that 
arise from the same nucleus of operative facts as a claim the federal courts would 
have jurisdiction over.24 
In addition to these situations in which the state law issues make up 
discrete causes of action, questions of federal law are often intertwined with 
questions of state law, for example when the federal court is considering a federal 
question to which federal common law applies and the content of that common 
law is state law.25 Other examples of intertwined issues include situations when 
the state law question is an essential step in the analysis of federal law, such as 
when the court must decide whether the federal constitution protects a right 
created by state law,26 or when a federal statute confers a benefit or puts a burden 
on a class of people defined by state law.27 A third category of these state-law-
 
objectively correct legal principles, and so a part of the inherent power of judges. Id. at 2. Federal 
judges would have the same power and expertise as state judges to discover these principles. Id.
The Court overruled Swift in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
 2428 U.S.C. § 1367. When federal court jurisdiction is based on diversity, there is no 
supplemental jurisdiction over parties that would destroy that diversity. 28 U.S.C. § 1367(b). 
 25E.g. Semtek Int’l, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001); United 
States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 739-40 (1979). 
 26This describes, generally, procedural due process cases. The constitution prohibits the 
government from depriving an individual of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. 
U.S. CONST. amend. V (applying to federal government); Id. amend. XIV (applying to the states). 
The first step in a procedural due process case is, generally, to decide whether there is a property 
or liberty interest that the law protects, and usually, that interest is created by state law. E.g. Bd. of 
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972). 
 27A well known example is the Internal Revenue Code which determines taxable income 
on the basis of whether an individual is married, but does not define how a person becomes 
married. See 26 U.S.C. § 1 (2000); cf. Id. § 7703 (providing rules that govern when in time a 
person is considered married if that person has had a change in marital status and that certain 
married people living apart will not be considered to be married). The federal Defense of Marriage 
Act provides another limit on the definition of marriage, providing that for federal purposes, 
antecedent situations occurs when the federal courts evaluate the constitutionality 
of state laws.  
 The analysis that follows will refer to state law as if it were a single and 
concrete concept. This is an oversimplification used to clarify a very murky area. 
In fact, state law issues may come to the federal courts in a number of ways. State 
law may be contained in a statute never interpreted by any state court, or it may 
be contained in a statute that a state court has interpreted at some point. 
Conversely, the law may have been made entirely through state common law. 
Finally, it may come to the Supreme Court by direct review, and the lower courts 
on certain limited kinds of collateral review, as a direct interpretation of the state 
law at issue by a state court applying that law to the exact factual context the 
federal courts face. The source and nature of the state law will make a difference 
in how the federal courts should interpret and apply that law.  
 This article also discusses state law as if it were a single entity, and that 
too is an oversimplification. For purposes of this discussion, the state law 
determinations could range from pure questions of law, like what law applies, to 
“mixed” questions of law and fact, or the application of the law to the facts.28 
marriage is any legal marriage between one man and one woman, but it does not define for that 
group what a legal marriage is. 1 U.S.C. § 7 (2000).  
 A similar issue is present when state law incorporates a federal law issue, such as when 
state tort law provides that violation of a federal regulation constitutes negligence per se, or when 
a state tax code defines taxable income as the income defined as taxable by the Internal Revenue 
Code. See Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804, 816 n.14 (1986) (quoting 
Moore v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. Co., 291 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1934) and affirming in dictum that 
the Supreme Court would have appellate jurisdiction over this federal question, but holding that 
normally, the issue would not present a federal question before the lower federal courts as their 
statutory “arising under” jurisdiction has been interpreted).  
 28This article does not touch on the amount of deference to be given to lower court 
findings of fact. For a discussion of that issue, see Monaghan, supra note 20 (Const’l fact review), 
at 236-38. Although some courts and scholars assert that the different types of question are 
Both categories may be reviewed de novo, but the more fact-intensive the 
question, the more the courts may choose to grant some deference to the lower 
courts.29 
A. Rules Providing Deference to State Court Determinations 
The propriety of whether federal courts should consider state law has been 
addressed in several different situations, with fairly consistent results. In the 
context of review of state court decisions, in 1875, the Supreme Court examined 
whether to review issues of state law in cases from state high courts when those 
state law issues were distinct from the federal law issues.30 The Court determined 
that under the jurisdictional statutes, it could review all of the federal issues, but 
that the holdings of the state court on issues of state law could not be reviewed.31 
discrete, they are more properly viewed on a continuum. Id. at 233; Professors Allen and Pardo 
argue that there is no defensible distinction between types of questions, and that questions of law 
are simply different types of fact questions. Ronald J. Allen & Michael S. Pardo, The Myth of the 
Law-Fact Distinction, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1769 (2003). 
 29Compare Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119 (2000) (applying de novo review to a 
determination of reasonable suspicion) with Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 
U.S. 159, 176 (1983) (deferring to application of law to the facts on whether a corporations 
activities constituted a unitary business); see also Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116, 136-37 (1999) 
(plurality) (stating that fact-intensive issues of constitutional law require de novo review); id. at 
148 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact-intensive nature warranted deference); 
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) (using de novo review because law “acquire[s] 
content only through application”); id. at 700 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the fact-
intensive nature of the question warranted deference). But see Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of 
United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) (holding that the in First Amendment cases, the 
Court must exercise de novo review of the law and facts). 
 30Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); see also Calder v. Bull, 3 
U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to decide whether state 
statutes are valid under state constitutional law). 
 31Id. at 632-33. This principle is so firmly established that in Ring v. Arizona, the 
Supreme Court deferred to an Arizona Supreme Court’s refusal to follow the United States 
Supreme Court’s prior interpretation of an Arizona death penalty statute. 536 U.S. 584, 603 
(2002). Some scholars have argued that Congress did intend to give the Supreme Court the power 
This principle lies beneath the rule that the Supreme Court will not exercise 
jurisdiction over a case in which a federal issue is present, even if that issue was 
wrongly decided by the state court, if the judgment in the case rests on “adequate 
and independent state grounds.”32 
Similar to the rules developed for Supreme Court review of state court 
decisions, federal courts encountering state issues must often defer to state court 
declarations of law. For example, sitting in diversity, the federal courts, by statute, 
must follow state constitutional, statutory, and common law.33 Thus, when the 
state’s highest court has declared what the law is, the federal courts must follow 
that when deciding diversity cases.  
 And similar to the adequate and independent state grounds threshold for 
Supreme Court review of state court decisions, lower federal courts will abstain 
entirely from considering cases in certain circumstances when state law is 
unclear.34 For the court to abstain in constitutional cases, the state law must be 
 
to review state court holdings on state court decisions because after the Civil War, Congress 
fundamentally distrusted the state courts. Richard A. Matasar & Gregory S. Bruch, Procedural 
Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the Adequate and Independent 
State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1319 (1986). 
 32Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 (1983). 
 33Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (interpreting the Rules of Decision Act 
which is now codified with a few minor differences at, 28 U.S.C. § 1625).  The holding in Erie 
rested, in part, on perceived constitutional limitations. John Hart Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of 
Erie, 87 HARV. L. REV. 693, 703 (1974); Paul J. Mishkin, Some Further Last Words on Erie, 87 
HARV. L. REV. 1682 (1974).  Some scholars have cast doubt on these principles as constitutionally 
required.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 315 (4th ed. 2003) (stating that “[t]he 
constitutional basis for . . . Erie . . . has confounded scholars,” citing Ely and Stewart Jay, Origins 
of Federal Common Law: Part Two, 133, U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985); Martin H. Redish & Carter 
G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the Appropriate Dilemma, 91 HARV.
L. REV. 356 (1977)). 
 34Railroad Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941) (concerning federal 
question cases); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943) (concerning complex state 
substantially uncertain and there must be a reasonable possibility that the state 
court’s clarification will resolve the issue so that the court need not get to the 
constitutional issue.35 In diversity cases, the state law issue must be unclear and 
the case must involve some important state interest that is part of the state’s 
unique power as sovereign, like eminent domain.36 Similarly, in federal question 
cases in which the issue is regulated by a complex state administrative process 
designed to treat uniformly an essentially local problem, the federal courts may 
defer to the state process rather than issue injunctive relief.37 
Special rules of construction have been developed that embody deference 
to the states for cases in which the federal courts must interpret state laws that 
have been challenged as violating the federal constitution.38 Statutes, even those 
enacted by states, are presumed to be constitutional, and a challenger bears the 
 
administrative procedures); Alabama Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 341 U.S. 341 (1951) (expanding 
Burford); Louisiana Power and Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959) (concerning 
diversity cases). 
 35Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 54 (1973) (citations omitted); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 
U.S. 360, 375 (1959) (citations omitted). 
 36Thibodaux, 360 U.S. at 28; see Alleghany County v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 
(1959) (holding that abstention is not always appropriate in eminent domain cases). 
 37Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996) (limiting this type of abstention 
to equitable relief); New Orleans Public Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans (NOPSI), 
491 U.S. 350, 364 (1989) (limiting abstention to situations that would substantially interfere with 
administration of an essentially local program). 
 38These ideologically neutral rules of construction have been called “quasi-constitutional 
law,” and can be used by the Court in a very sophisticated way to promote a number of values, 
including ideological ones, through its decisionmaking. William N. Eskridge & Philip P. Frickey, 
Quasi-Constitutional Law: Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. 
REV. 593 (1992). 
burden of demonstrating that a statute violates the constitution.39 Where the 
challenge is that the law is unconstitutionally vague, it must be vague in all of its 
applications, not merely unclear in some instances.40 Where a statute might seem 
on its face to violate the constitution, if the state court has given the statute a 
narrower construction that would be constitutional, that construction will be 
upheld.41 
B. Rules Providing Less Deference to State Courts 
The federal courts will not always defer to state court determinations, 
however. Even in the diversity context, the federal courts have some flexibility to 
interpret state law. If the state’s highest court has not spoken on the issue, the 
federal courts are not required to certify a question to those courts. And they do 
not have to defer to the state’s appellate courts unless the federal courts are 
convinced that the state supreme court would agree. In other words, the federal 
courts are allowed to predict how the state supreme court would decide the 
issue.42 
39Lujan v. G & G Fire Sprinklers , Inc., 532 U.S. 189, 198 (2001) (citing INS v. Chadha, 
462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)). 
 40Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 121 n.50 (1972) (citing Shuttlesworth v. 
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 91 (1965)). 
 41Bell v. Cone, 543 U.S. 447, ___, 125 S. Ct. 847, 851-52 (2005) (quoting Walton v. 
Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 654 (1990), overruled on other grounds by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 
(2002)). In a way that is less deferential to the states than abstention, in cases that involve 
constitutional issues and pendent state law claims, a federal court can decide the issue on the state 
law claim if doing so avoids the constitutional issue, and need not refer it to the state for decision. 
Siler v. Louisiana & N. R.R., 213 U.S. 175 (1909). That approach affords the state significant 
deference by not calling a state law into constitutional question, and avoids some of the problems 
posed by abstention, such as delay and increased cost. 
 42CHARLES WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, FEDERAL COURTS 396 (6th ed. 2002). 
Additionally, the Supreme Court has traditionally deferred to the findings of lower federal courts 
Additionally, there are many situations in the state-law-antecedent cases 
where the federal courts will interpret what state law means even if the federal 
court also gives some amount deference to a state court interpretation. State law is 
antecedent to a federal issue when the “existence, application or implementation 
of a federal right turns on the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state 
law.”43 When the federal right depends in this way on an issue of state law, the 
federal courts have the ability and the duty to decide what impact the state law 
will have on the federal law.44 That impact, is actually a federal question, and not 
really interpretation of the state law at all, even though the federal court analysis 
may look as if the federal court is interpreting the state law.45 Moreover, even in 
a state-law-antecedent case in which the state court construction of the issue 
would resolve the matter and preclude consideration of the federal question, the 
federal court may need to review the state law to some extent to ensure at the least 
that the law is not being construed to impair federal interests.46 As a practical 
matter as well, the Supreme Court will often interpret state law, rather than 
 
on the law of a state within their jurisdictions. Phillipps v. Washington Legal Foundation, 524 
U.S. 156, 167 (1998). Deference is not warranted if state expertise would not be warranted in 
interpreting the state law. Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 125 S. Ct. 2796, 2804 (2005). 
 43Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the 
Law and Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977). 
 44Henry Paul Monaghan, Supreme Court Review of State-Court Determinations of State 
Law in Constitutional Cases, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1919, 1925-26, 1935-47 (2003).  
 45Id. (analyzing the issue primarily in the context of constitutional cases and referring to 
this as “characterization” of the issue for federal law purposes). 
 46RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. SHAPIRO, HART AND 
WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 498 (5th ed. 2003) [hereinafter 
HART AND WECHSLER]; Laura S. Fitzgerald, Suspecting the States: Supreme Court Review of 
State-Court State-Law Judgments, 101 MICH. L. REV. 80 (2002) (arguing that the Supreme Court 
should defer to state court judgments unless it explains why it has reason to suspect the states of 
remand the matter to the state’s highest court for its interpretation when it must 
determine whether a right under a state statute was unconstitutionally denied,47 or 
when the state statute itself is unconstitutional.48 
When a state court has spoken on the issue, the Supreme Court usually 
looks to see whether the decision of the state court “rests upon a fair or substantial 
basis . . . [I]f there is no evasion of the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal 
ground of decision has fair support, [the Supreme] Court will not . . . substitute its 
own view of what should be deemed the better rule.”49 This fair support rule 
applies generally to state-law-antecedent issues. 
 But the Supreme Court does not always follow the fair support rule. In 
Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,50 for example, the issue before the Court was 
whether a teacher had a vested contract right that could not be impaired under the 
constitution’s Contract Clause.51 The Indiana Supreme Court had ruled that she 
had no contract under Indiana law, but the Supreme Court stated: 
On such a question, one primarily of state law, we accord 
respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state’s 
highest court but, in order that the constitutional mandate may not 
become a dead letter, we are bound to decide for ourselves whether 
a contract was made, what are its terms and conditions, and 
whether the State has, by later legislation, impaired its obligation. 
This involves an appraisal of the statutes of the State and the 
 
frustrating the operation of federal law).  
 47Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938). 
 48Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 316 U.S. 481 (1942). 
 49Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540 (1930). 
 50303 U.S. 95 (1938). 
 51Id. at 96-99. The constitution’s Contracts Clause is in art. I, §10. 
decisions of its courts.52 
The Supreme Court found, contrary to the Indiana Supreme Court, that the 
Indiana statutes and the state’s actions under those statutes created a contract 
between the teacher and the state, which was protected under the constitution’s 
Contracts Clause.53 
Even though the Supreme Court found no evasion of the constitutional 
issue, the Supreme Court did not evaluate whether the state court’s interpretation 
of state law had fair support.  Thus, federal supremacy may sometimes provide a 
basis for the federal courts to deviate from the normal rules of deference.   
 C. Unifying the Two Approaches 
This review of deference rules reveals that the amount of deference that 
the federal courts afford the states ranges from total abstention, to de novo review 
of state law. The rules that have emerged are pragmatic and balance state 
autonomy against federal interests.54 Essentially, the traditional rule has embodied 
 
52Brand, 303 U.S. at 100. 
 53Id. at 105, 108-09. It is possible that rather than deciding the issue as a matter of state 
law, the Court was deciding the federal effect of the state laws. See General Motors Corp. v. 
Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (“The question whether a contract was made is a federal 
question for purposes of Contract Clause analysis . . . and ‘whether it turns on issues of general or 
purely local law we cannot surrender the duty to exercise our own judgment.’”). Professors 
Monaghan and Fallon argue that the Due Process clause has some core conception of liberty and 
property, defined as matters of federal law, that state law must satisfy, but state law rarely fails to 
satisfy those thresholds. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Some Confusions about Due Process, Judicial 
Review, and Constitutional Remedies, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 309, 327-29 (1993); Henry Paul 
Monaghan, Of Liberty and Property, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 405, 440 (1977); see also Sandin v. 
Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484-86 (1995) (holding that state law mandating certain procedures be 
followed before a prison inmate could be disciplined did not by itself create a liberty interest but 
that only a sentence that “imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the 
ordinary incidents of prison life” would impair the limited liberty interest an inmate could have). 
 54The rules could actually promote an ideological purpose of the Court, rather than a 
a dualist federal approach: the federal courts primarily review issues of federal 
law, and state high court determinations are mostly final on issues of state law.55 
While that is a general rule, the federal courts are less likely to defer or 
affirmatively ask the state to interpret a state law when faced with a state-law-
antecedent situation. 
 This description of the federal court approach to state law issues 
demonstrates that in practice, the decisions of the federal court can appear ad hoc 
and result oriented. And when judicial federalism cases are compared to other 
cases considering legislative federalism, the federal courts’ approach seems even 
more confusing. The Supreme Court seems sometimes to be promoting state’s 
rights and sometimes to be expanding the national power without consistency. 
 Most recently, the Rehnquist Court seemed to breathe new life into state 
power by limiting Congress’ power under the commerce clause and Section Five 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, while strengthening the Tenth and Eleventh 
Amendments. In United States v. Lopez56 in 1995 and United States v. Morrison57 
in 2000, the Court struck down legislation as beyond Congress’ commerce clause 
power, for the first time since 1937.58 In City of Boerne v. Flores,59 the Court 
 
neutral federalism purpose. Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, The Three Faces of Federalism: 
An Empirical Assessment of Supreme Court Federalism Jurisprudence, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 741 
(2000) (documenting how the Justices use federalism strategically to promote ideological goals). 
 55Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
 56514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 57529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 58Erwin Chemerinsky, The Rehnquist Revolution, 2 PIERCE L. REV. 1, 2-3 (2004). Since 
Morrison, the Court seems to have stepped back from this states rights jurisprudence. In Gonzales 
v. Raich, 545 U.S. ___, 125 S. Ct. 2195 (2005), the Court upheld the federal Controlled 
Substances Act as valid commerce clause legislation that preempted California’s Compassionate 
limited Congress’ power to create legislative rights broader than the constitutional 
rights the Fourteenth Amendment created.60 That decision was applied to broaden 
the reach of the Eleventh Amendment, limiting Congress’ ability to subject the 
states to suits for money damages.61 Using the Tenth Amendment, as well, the 
Court during this time period limited federal power in New York v. United States62 
Use Act. The Compassionate Use Act had allowed individuals to grow small amounts of 
marijuana for their own use when a doctor recommends the drug for serious medical conditions. 
Cal. Health & Safety Code Ann. §11362.5 (West Supp. 2005). In its most recent decision, the 
Court avoided the federalism issue in a case involving the executive branch’s attempts to preempt 
Oregon’s Death with Dignity Act, which allowed doctors to prescribe drugs to help terminally ill 
patients commit suicide, by finding that Congress failed to give the executive branch the power to 
prohibit doctors from prescribing these drugs. Gonzales v. Oregon, 04-623 (Jan. 17, 2006). 
 59521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
 60Id. at 519-20, 536. 
 61Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 
62 (2000); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666 
(1999); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999). 
The Eleventh Amendment was strengthened in this way by Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 
(1996), in which the Court held that Congress could only abrogate state sovereign immunity under 
its Fourteenth Amendment powers. Not only are states immune from suit in federal court, but 
Congress cannot subject them to suit in their own courts either. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 
(1999). For a thorough analysis if this Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence, see Marcia L. 
McCormick, Federalism Re-Constructed, 37. IND. L. REV. 345 (2004). 
 Like in the commerce clause context, the Court seems to be stepping back here as well. 
Four cases in the last three years have upheld Congress’ power. In Nevada Department of Human 
Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721 (2003), the Court held that Congress had the power under the 
Fourteenth Amendment to enact the Family Medical Leave Act. In Tennessee v. Lane, 540 U.S. 
___, 124 S. Ct. 1978 (2004), the Court upheld Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act as a 
valid abrogation of state sovereign immunity at least as far as it mandated access to courthouses 
and other functions of government. Then in two bankruptcy cases, Tennessee Student Assistance 
Corp. v. Hood, 541 U.S. 440 (2004) and Central Virginia Community College v. Katz, ___ U.S. 
___, 2006 WL 151985 (Jan. 23, 2006), the Court held that Congress could subject the state to suit 
in in rem bankruptcy proceedings under its bankruptcy powers in article I. 
 62505 U.S. 144 (1992) (finding that Congress could not “commandeer” state governments 
to accept ownership of radioactive waste or implement federal legislation on the subject). 
and Printz v. United States.63 The Court has also taken a restrictive view of 
federal power in habeas corpus jurisdiction64 and civil rights cases.65 
Currently, in all but the Tenth Amendment context, the Court has issued 
subsequent decisions that elevate federal interests above states rights.66 And at the 
same time that it issued the strong states rights decisions described above, the 
Court has issued decisions that extend the national power in other areas.67 
Taken as a whole, then, the Court’s federalism decisions seem inconsistent 
and ideologically based.68 The following section of this article seeks to divine 
some non-ideological guiding principles that federal courts can draw on to explain 
the level of deference they are giving to the states in state law issues. 
 III. FEDERAL CONSIDERATION OF STATE-LEVEL INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE 
As the federal courts encounter state court determinations or state common 
law, there is a spectrum of options available to the federal courts. At one end of 
 
63521 U.S. 898 (1997) (prohibiting Congress’ mandate that local law enforcement 
conduct background checks on applicants for gun permits as commandeering). 
 64E.g. Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S. 298, 318 (1995) (expressing concern that habeas filings 
threatened the finality of state court judgments, implicating comity and federalism). 
 65E.g. Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 421 (1996); Growe v. Emison, 507 U.S. 
25, 32 (1993).  But see Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 1069 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting) 
(criticizing majority opinion as ignoring federalism interests). 
 66Supra notes 58, 61. 
 67E.g. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, Maine, 520 U.S. 564 
(1997) (striking down a state tax incentive on dormant commerce clause grounds; Morales v. 
Trans World Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992) (finding state law preempted). 
 68Cross & Tiller, supra note 54, at 757-62, 768; David Niven & Kenneth W. Miller, 
Federalism by Convenience: The Supreme Court’s Judicial Federalists on the Death Penalty and 
States Rights Controversies, 33 CAP. U. L. REV. 567 (2005); see also Jackson, Narratives, supra 
note 3, at 280. 
the spectrum, the federal courts would abstain from deciding issues of state law at 
all, and would simply defer entirely to any state determination of what the law 
means or how it should be applied to these facts. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the federal courts would review every issue of law or fact de novo, with no 
deference to any prior holdings by the state courts either in the case before the 
federal court or in one that would be precedential in state court.  
 While all of the cases fall along this continuum, the federal courts rarely 
explain what reasoning underlies their decisions to defer or not. A great number 
of the variances from the usual rule of deference can be explained, however, by 
notions of institutional competency: the federal courts are deferring to the state 
institution that is most competent to perform the task at issue or not deferring 
where the particular state institution lacks special competency. 
 Federal court discourse has long incorporated the concept of institutional 
competence, usually under the principle of separation of powers. That notion, has 
nearly always been articulated when it has been employed in a fashion, horizontal 
to the federal judicial branch, with the federal courts determining whether the 
federal judicial branch, Congress, or the President is more properly suited for a 
particular task. Occasionally, though, state-level institutional competence has 
been the explicit focus of the federal courts. Chief Justice Rehnquist’s 
concurrence in Bush v. Gore69 is the most famous, or infamous, example. 
 This part analyzes the cases in which the Supreme Court has not deferred 
to state court interpretations of state law with a particular focus on those cases in 
which the Court has explicitly deferred to the state legislative branch.  I submit 
that because the federal constitution rarely differentiates between the branches of 
 
69531 U.S. 98, 111-22 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
state government, the federal courts have little justification for doing so.  
Ultimately, deciding which branch of state government should have primacy over 
any particular issue is a matter of state constitutional law.  In other words, just as 
federal judicial review is part of the federal courts’ constitutional power, the 
interpretation of state law is simply an exercise of the state courts state 
constitutional power. As such, the balance of that power should be left to the 
states to work out.  
 A. Independent Review in State Courts’ Interpretations  
 of the Meaning or Content of State Law 
The Supreme Court has admitted that it is engaging in independent review 
of the meaning of state law and rejected the state court’s interpretation of that law 
in few cases, and each of those instances was in service to the supremacy of an 
important and substantive federal right or enumerated power. In Fairfax’s Devisee 
v. Hunter’s Lessee,70 for example, the Supreme Court had reviewed the state law 
of Virginia independently to determine the proper title to land because the state 
law issues were antecedent to deciding what rights the putative owner had under 
federal treaty.71 State hostility to the role of the Supreme Court and the supremacy 
of federal law at the time of the Fairfax case may have made such rejection 
necessary.72 Born out of similar resistance to federal authority, the Supreme 
 
7011 U.S. (7 Cranch.) 603 (1813). 
 71Id. at 618-28. The Court explained its reasoning to do this in Fairfax in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 357-58 (1816).  
 72Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing GERALD GUNTHER &
K. SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 61-62 (13th ed. 1997)). This hostility was based at least in 
part on state hostility to British creditors after the Revolutionary War. Wythe Holt, “To Establish 
Justice”: Politics, the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE 
L.J. 1421, 1438-49. 
Court’s decisions in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson73 and Bouie v. City of 
Columbia74 rejected state supreme court deviations from prior state law when 
those deviations themselves violated due process.75 And at a more stable time in 
history, in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand,76 the Supreme Court similarly 
rejected the Indiana Supreme Court’s construction of state law where that 
construction could be argued to have deprived a teacher of property without due 
process of law.77 
Conversely, in most instances in which a state court is interpreting what a 
state statute means, the federal courts will defer to that state court interpretation.78 
But this is not always the case. The most controversial example is Bush v. Gore,
in which a majority of the Supreme Court ordered an end to a recount of ballots 
cast in the 2000 presidential election.79 The majority held that no constitutionally 
permissible recount could be accomplished by a deadline that gave the states a 
“safe harbor,” even though the Florida Supreme Court was given no opportunity 
 
73357 U.S. 449 (1958). 
 74378 U.S. 347 (1964). 
 75Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350; Patterson, 357 U.S. at 455. 
 76303 U.S. 95 (1938). This case is discussed in greater detail in part II, B, supra.
77Id. at 108-10. 
 78See, e.g., Johnson v. Fankell, 520 U.S. 911 (1997) (holding that the federal courts lack 
the authority to construe a state statute differently than the state’s highest court has);R.A.V. v. St. 
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 381 (1992) (holding that state supreme court’s interpretation was binding); 
United States v. Thirty-Seven (37) Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 369 (1971) (putting the issue in 
jurisdictional terms); see also Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 483 (1993) (contrasting 
interpretation of a state statute from conclusions about what effect the statute has). 
 79531 U.S. 98, 105-11 (2000).  
to determine whether the legislature intended to take advantage of this deadline in 
a situation like this.80 Rather than remand to the Florida Supreme Court to order 
that the recount proceed in a method consistent with Florida’s election law, the 
Supreme Court held that any constitutional method could not complete the 
recount in time to comply with what it interpreted the election law to require.81 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence went further. In it he argued that 
the Florida Supreme Court misinterpreted Florida election law when it ordered the 
recount and, thus, impermissibly thwarted the will of the Florida Legislature.82 As 
a precursor to this conclusion, the Chief Justice argued that the United States 
Supreme Court had a duty under Article II of the United States Constitution, 
which assigned the power to direct the appointment of electors to the legislatures 
of the states, to ensure that the state judicial branch was faithful to the will of the 
state legislative branch.83 He explained that given this federal constitutional duty, 
the review and rejection of the state court interpretation of state law “does not 
imply a disrespect for state courts but rather a respect for the constitutionally 
prescribed role of state legislatures.”84 
Thus, where the state courts are suspected of undermining the supremacy 
of the federal government as an institution, depriving an individual of a federal 
constitutional right, or otherwise violating an express provision of the 
 
80Id. at 110-11. 
 81Id. at 111. 
 82Id. at 116-22 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).  
 83Id. at 111-13 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 84Id. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (emphasis in original). 
constitution, the federal courts will not defer to those courts.85 
B. Independent Review in the Statutory Purpose Context 
Another less analyzed area is state court declarations of the purpose of 
legislation. The purpose of legislation is an important consideration in First and 
Fourteenth Amendment constitutional analysis, as well as dormant commerce 
clause analysis. In these contexts, the courts apply varying levels of scrutiny 
based on the type of legislation at issue and the interest at stake, and these levels 
of scrutiny embody varying levels of deference to the states. Some types of 
restrictions and classifications are simply not allowed. For example, in the 
Establishment Clause context, the government may not impose a requirement or 
restriction on individuals for a religious purpose.86 Other restrictions and 
classifications are given strict scrutiny: the law must be the least restrictive means 
to achieve a compelling state interest.87 Still others receive intermediate scrutiny: 
the law must be substantially related to an important state interest.88 The vast 
majority of legislation receives rational basis review: the law must be rationally 
related to a legitimate governmental purpose.89 
85Laura S. Fitzgerald has argued that these should be the only times that the federal courts 
should fail to defer to state court interpretations of state law.  Fitzgerald, supra note 46. 
 86Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 613 (1971). 
 87Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 U.S. 267, 273-74 (1986). 
 88United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 524 (1996). 
 89Heller v. Doe by Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-20 (1993). Justice O’Connor suggested that 
there should be an even lower threshold for invalidating state legislation under the commerce 
clause than the standard used under the due process clause because a federal court decision on 
commerce clause grounds may be overcome more easily by the legislature. ASARCO, Inc. v. 
Idaho St. Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307, 350 n.14 (1982) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); see also 
Richard A. Cordray & James T. Vradelis, Comment, The Emerging Jurisprudence of Justice 
For strict and intermediate scrutiny, the state bears the burden to 
demonstrate that the purpose of the legislation is to promote the right kind of 
governmental interest.90 For rational basis review, on the other hand, the burden is 
on the challenger to demonstrate either no legitimate governmental interest, or no 
rational relationship between the interest and the means chosen by the 
legislature.91 The legislature need not articulate that purpose, and if they do not, 
the courts will evaluate whether any plausible legitimate purpose could be behind 
the legislation.92 This test is not completely boundless, however. The legislature 
must have been able to consider the legislative facts before it to be true.93 Still, 
those facts need not actually be true; that legislative facts turn out to be mistaken 
is not a reason to reject a purpose based on those facts.94 
The Supreme Court has stated that it affords deference to state court 
declarations of purpose similar to that, if not quite at the same level, of 
interpretations of meaning.95 For example, in United States Term Limits, Inc. v. 
 
O’Connor, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 389, 419 (1985). 
 90Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33 (stating that in intermediate scrutiny cases, the state bears 
the burden to show an important governmental objective and that the means are substantiallly 
related to that objective); Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 922 (1995) (holding that in the strict 
scrutiny context, the state may not simply assert that the interest to be served is compelling and the 
means narrowly tailored, but must provide strong evidence of it).  
 91Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 U.S. 103, 109 (2003) (quoting Madden 
v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 88 (1940)). 
 92Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992). 
 93Id. at 11. 
 94Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (holding that the belief is 
enough). 
 95This qualification was noted by Justice Breyer in his dissent in Kansas v. Hendricks,
521 U.S. 346, 383-84 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting), although it is not made explicit in the cases 
Thornton,96 the Court stated, “[w]e must, of course, accept the state court’s view 
of the purpose of its own law.”97 Similarly, in Allen v. Illinois,98 both the majority 
and the dissent agreed that the state court was the authority on both the meaning 
and purpose of state law.99 In fact, the rules that the Supreme Court has developed 
will sometimes lead to greater deference to findings of purpose.  For example, the 
Supreme Court has held that the purpose of a state law is a question of fact,100 and 
that the parties may present evidence on the subject.101 
that he cites. 
 96514 U.S. 779 (1995). 
 97Id. at 829.  
 98478 U.S. 364 (1986). 
 99Id. at 367 (accepting the state court’s interpretation of purpose, but also analyzing the 
statute); Id. at 380 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (stating that the state is the final authority on both 
meaning and purpose, but disagreeing with the effect of the statute). 
 100Crawford v. Bd. of Educ. of Los Angeles, 458 U.S. 527, 544 (1982) (treating the issue 
as one of fact). Although the law at issue in Crawford was a proposition amending California’s 
constitution, the Supreme Court did not indicate that the type of state law made a difference in the 
analysis, and it does not seem that a statute’s purpose should be treated more like a question of 
law. Certainly state court interpretations of the meaning of state constitutional provisions should 
be given enormous deference because those constitutions embody a particularly sovereign interest, 
the state courts are uniquely situated to interpret that meaning, and the federal courts are not 
competent to second-guess the state courts except in extremely rare circumstances. However, the 
issue is not one of meaning, but rather one of purpose, which is more like a historical fact than is 
the slippery notion of group intent.  
 101United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938). It is not enough to 
provide evidence that the legislature was mistaken, however.  
[S]o long as “it is evident from all the considerations presented to [the 
legislature], and those of which we may take judicial notice, that the question is 
at least debatable.” Where there was evidence before the legislature reasonably 
supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invalidation of the 
legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was 
mistaken. 
Minn. v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981) (quoting Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 
Despite these assertions, the Supreme Court has rejected state court 
findings of purpose in several cases. In the Establishment Clause context, the 
Court has stated, “[w]hile the Court is normally deferential to a State's articulation 
of a secular purpose, it is required that the statement of such purpose be sincere 
and not a sham.”102 Because Establishment Clause cases warrant a very searching 
review, this result seems analogous to those cases involving meaning where the 
Court suspected the state courts of evading Supreme Court review. 
 In the context of rational basis review as well, though, the Supreme Court 
has rejected state court findings of purpose. In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. 
Commission of Webster County,103 the statute and constitution of the state 
provided that property tax valuation be based on a particular criterion.104 The 
Supreme Court rejected a state court finding that the legislature could have 
intended to base valuation on a different and incompatible criterion.105 
While in these examples the Supreme Court is rejecting an expansive 
 
at 154.). That is not the type of proof at issue in Fitzgerald or Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 
(1997), discussed infra. Those cases concerned evidence of what the legislature considered and 
intended, not of the validity of the facts before the legislature. 
 102Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 586-87 (1987) (citing Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 
U.S.38, 64 (1985) (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 75, (O'Connor, J., concurring in judgment); Stone 
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223-24 
(1963)). 
 103488 U.S. 336 (1989). 
 104Id. at 345. 
 105Id.; see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 14-15, 16-17 and n.7 (1992) 
(distinguishing the situation before it from Allegheny Pittsburgh). In another situation in which the 
Supreme Court defended its decision to construe purpose broadly, the Court distinguished a prior 
case that had not. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 530 (1959) (distinguishing 
Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S. 562, 572 (1949) and stating, “[h]aving themselves 
specifically declared their purpose, the Ohio statutes left no room to conceive of any other purpose 
for their existence”). 
interpretation of purpose, found in an attempt to make state legislation legitimate, 
in at least two recent cases, the Court has rejected limiting interpretations of 
purpose state courts used to strike down legislation, as well. In Kansas v. 
Hendricks,106 a Kansas man challenged the state’s Sexually Violent Predator 
Act,107 arguing among other things that it was a punitive statute which violated 
the federal constitutional prohibitions against double jeopardy and ex post facto 
laws.108 The Supreme Court treated as a matter of law, and thus a question of 
statutory construction, the law’s classification as civil or criminal.109 The court 
then looked at the placement of the statute in the Kansas codes and analyzed the 
statute’s language and structure.110 The Court found that two things manifested 
the intent of the legislature that the statute not be punitive: 1) the placement of the 
statute in the probate code; and 2) the statement within the statute that its purpose 
was to create a civil commitment procedure.111 
The Kansas Supreme Court had held, despite these two things, that the 
“overriding” purpose of the statute was punitive – to segregate people subject to it 
from the public – and that any treatment was “incidental at best.”112 The court 
held this, in part because the legislature had stated in its declaration of purpose 
 
106521 U.S. 346 (1997). 
 107Kan. Stat. Ann. §§59-29a01 through 29a21 (2005).  
 108Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 360-61. 
 109Id. at 361 (citing Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 368 (1986)). 
 110Id. at 361-67. 
 111Id. at 362. 
 112In re Care & Treatment of Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 136 (Kan. 1996). 
that sexually violent predators could not be treated under the existing civil 
commitment statute, which provided for commitment of people with mental 
illnesses, and no effort had been made to treat any offenders.113 Accordingly, the 
Kansas Supreme Court held that the primary purpose of the statute was to 
incarcerate, not to provide treatment.114 
The United States Supreme Court rejected this formulation, finding that 
the statute could have more than one purpose, and the mere possibility that the 
Kansas legislature could have intended that sexually violent predators be treated 
in an ideal world was enough to make this a civil statute.115 
Justice Breyer dissented, arguing that the statute contained enough 
punitive aspects that its purpose was ambiguous.116 Given that ambiguity, Justice 
Breyer argued that the finding by the Kansas Supreme Court that the purpose of 
the statute was to incapacitate and not to treat offenders should be entitled to 
deference.117 
Six years later, Justice Breyer delivered the opinion in Fitzgerald v. 
Racing Association of Central Iowa for a unanimous court, refusing to defer to the 
 
113Id. The state supreme court found it particularly troubling that the statute did not even 
allow for treatment until after a sexually violent predator had served the original criminal 
sentence. Id. 
114Id. 
115Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 367-69. 
 116Id. at 379-81 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 117Id. at 384-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Justice Breyer supported the finding of the 
Kansas Supreme Court by analyzing the statute and the record, which detailed the lack of effort 
made to treat Hendricks. Id. at 385-95 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
Iowa Supreme Court’s finding of purpose.118 At issue in Fitzgerald was a tax on 
the proceeds of slot machines at the state’s racetracks and riverboats; these 
proceeds were the primary source of revenue for both types of gaming 
establishment.119 At the state’s horse and dog racetracks, slot machine proceeds 
were taxed at a maximum of thirty-six percent, while at the state’s riverboats, they 
were taxed at a maximum of twenty percent.120 Finding that the proceeds were 
similarly situated, the Iowa Supreme Court then found the scheme irrational 
because the tax frustrated the purpose of the act creating it.121 The purpose found 
by Iowa Supreme Court was to promote the state’s racing industry, in an effort to 
make an unprofitable venture profitable again.122 Taxing the proceeds at the race 
tracks at a rate so much higher than that of the riverboats damaged that 
profitability, defeating the purpose of the act.123 
The race tracks argued that when the state court determined what the 
purpose of the act was, the court was interpreting Iowa law, and that interpretation 
deserved the usual deference.124 In other words, that interpretation was binding on 
 
118539 U.S. 103 (2003). 
 119 Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 559 (Iowa 2002).  
 120Iowa Code §99F.4A(6), 99F.11 (2003).  
 121Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 648 N.W.2d at 561. 
 122Id. at 560. 
 123Id. at 560-61, 562. Before the Iowa Supreme Court, the state argued that the purpose of 
the act was to encourage economic growth and promote agriculture. Id. at 560. The court found 
that even if this were the purpose of the act, this purpose too was frustrated by the higher tax rate 
on racetracks. Id. at 561. 
 124Transcript of Oral Argument at 26, Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Central Iowa, 539 
U.S. 103 (Apr. 29, 2003) (No. 02-695).  
the United States Supreme Court.125 The state court had found that the purpose of 
the statute at issue was to promote the racing industry in Iowa, and that the 
differential tax rate was not rationally related to that purpose.126 
But the Supreme Court did not agree that it owed any deference to the 
state court. Rather than accept the purpose the state court found, the actual127 
purpose, the Supreme Court theorized multiple potential legitimate state interests 
that the differential tax could rationally relate to, found that rational relationship, 
and upheld the tax under the federal constitution.128 To justify its decision not to 
defer to the state court, the Supreme Court stated,“the Constitution grants 
legislators, not courts, broad authority (within the bounds of rationality) to decide 
whom they wish to help with their tax laws and how much help those laws ought 
to provide.”129 In other words, rather than defer to the state court, the Supreme 
 
125Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). 
 126This was the stated purpose of the legislation. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa v. 
Fitzgerald, 648 N.W.2d 555, 560-61(2002). At trial, the state contended that another purpose of 
the legislation was economic development. Id. at 560. The court found that the differential level of 
taxation could only serve to drive the racetracks out of business. Id. at 561. 
 127I use this term here to highlight the approach of the Iowa Supreme Court, and not 
necessarily as an endorsement of the correctness of that court’s holding. 
 128Not to be outdone, the Iowa Supreme Court later struck down the tax under the Iowa 
Constitution’s Equal Protection provision, although it did so not by creating a separate test under 
its constitution, but through an “independent application” of the federal test. Racing Ass’n of 
Central Iowa v. Fitzgerald, 675 N.W.2d 1, 6-7 (Iowa 2004) (citing William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 500 (1977)),  There 
is no (federal) question that the Iowa court could do that and reach the same result the United 
States Supreme Court had rejected as long as the Iowa court’s result rested on the Iowa 
Constitution. See Robert F. Williams, State Courts Adopting Federal Constitutional Doctrine: 
Case-by-Case Adoptionism or Prospective Lockstepping, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1499, 1501, 
1514 (2005). 
 129Fitzgerald v. Racing Ass’n of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. at 108. 
Court deferred to the state legislature. 
 While this may seem analogous to Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in 
Bush v. Gore, which relied on the constitutional delegation of authority to the 
state legislative branch, one important ingredient is missing.  The constitution 
does not expressly delegate the authority to set state policy to the state legislative 
branch.  That power would be reserved to the state as a whole, as evidenced by 
the Tenth Amendment, which makes no distinction between the branches of state 
government.130 
Certainly, there may be other arguments that support the decision to defer 
to a particular branch of state government in the purpose context that are different 
from those in the meaning context.  For example, less deference may be 
warranted in the purpose context than that given in the meaning context because 
saying what a statute means is different from saying why a statute exists, and that 
difference suggests different institutional competencies. The language and 
meaning of the statute determine how that statute will operate on the world. 
Conversely, the purpose of legislation has very little effect on the world. It can be 
used to help interpret the meaning, or, given an improper purpose, it can make the 
statute invalid. However, the purpose by itself usually changes nothing in the 
world.  
 Additionally, the legislature is in a position better than the courts to say 
why a statute is needed. Thus, when the legislative act is presumptively valid, in 
other words when rational basis would apply under a constitutional analysis, the 
federal courts must defer to legislative possibilities rather than the holdings of 
courts. Conversely, where the judicial branch has greater competence, which it 
 
130U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
does when it interprets what the law means as written because by doing that it 
gives effect to legislative intent and culls a single meaning from multiple actors, 
the state judicial branch warrants deference. 
 Yet, an equally persuasive argument could be made to treat purpose 
interpretations with more rather than less deference. The federal courts have 
expertise equal to that of state courts to interpret statutory language. Statutory 
interpretation is something that all courts do. Conversely, the state courts are in a 
much better position, as part of the state government, to understand why particular 
legislation was passed. The state judges are more likely to know what public 
debate over the issues was when the legislation was created than are their federal 
counterparts. State judges are also more likely to have some insight into the state 
legislative process. Thus, the state courts are in a substantially better position to 
interpret the purpose of state legislation than are the federal courts.131 
C. Separation of Powers at the State Level 
The lesson to be taken from all of these cases and modes of deference is 
that where the constitution affords leeway to the states, the court is likely to defer 
to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judiciary. This was 
implied by the majority in Hendricks, and it was stated explicitly by the Court in 
Fitzgerald. Conversely, where the constitution limits state power more, the court 
is more likely to defer to the interpretation of state law by state courts unless there 
is a reason to suspect the courts themselves of interpreting the state law in order to 
mask a constitutional violation or to deprive a party of due process or equal 
 
131On yet another side, the fact of the Fourteenth Amendment may suggest that states 
cannot be trusted to tell the truth about what the purpose of some legislation is if that legislation 
impacts individual rights. See Richard L. Aynes, On Misreading John Bingham and the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 103 YALE L. J. 57, 66-74 (1993). 
protection.132 
But, there is nothing in the federal constitution that warrants giving 
deference to the state legislative branch at the expense of the state judicial branch 
in the majority of situations. The federal constitution does not distinguish between 
state legislative and judicial branches in describing the powers of each.133 And, 
the only constitutional provision that limits the form the state government may 
take and the distribution of powers within state government is the Guarantee 
Clause, which provides 
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a 
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them 
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the 
Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened), against 
domestic Violence.134 
Not only is the constitution silent about how states organize themselves within the 
 
132This was Justice Rehnquist’s stated reason for deferring to the legislative branch in his 
concurrence in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); see also 
Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 
HARV. L. REV. 1842, 1900-01 (2001). 
 133It is true as Chief Justice Rehnquist noted in his concurrence in Bush v. Gore that 
Article II, Section 1 delegates the power to determine how to elect presidential electors to the 
legislature of each state. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1. Article I, Section 4, which details how members 
of Congress shall be elected also refers to state legislatures and contrasts that power with 
Congress’ power, rather that the power of the state judicial branch. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. In other 
places as well the constitution refers to different branches of state government, assuming a 
structure somewhat similar to that of the federal government.  Michael C. Dorf, The Relevance of 
Federal Norms for State Separation of Powers, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 51, 54-58 (1998).  
No section suggests anything about the primacy of one branch over another. Moreover, there is no 
historical support for the significance of the language in Article II.  Hayward H. Smith, History of 
the Article II Independent State Legislature Doctrine, 29 FLA. ST. UNIV. L. REV. 731 (2001). 
 134U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
bounds of a republican form of government,135 the Supreme Court has held that 
interpretation of this clause is a political question and not justiciable.136 
State constitutions, then, define how state governments are to be formed 
and how various governmental powers exercised, and because the institutions of 
government are not identical to their federal counterparts, the competence of those 
institutions is not identical to that of their federal counterparts, and their powers 
need not be separated in exactly the same way.137 In fact, state constitutions often 
 
135This silence has not uniformly been interpreted to mean that the constitution fails to 
limit the exercise of power within state government. Dorf, supra note 133, at 58 (arguing that the 
structure of the federal constitution implies that states should be organized in federal-style 
separation of powers terms); Louis H. Pollak, Judicial Power and “The Politics of the People”, 72 
YALE L. J. 81, 88 (1962) (stating that the federal constitution suggests that a republican form of 
government meant a tripartite arrangement like that of the federal government). 
 136Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 42 (1849). That the issue is a political question 
does not leave the states entirely unregulated. The federal government must guarantee that a 
state’s form of government is republican, and with the federal courts out of the picture, it is up to 
Congress to interpret what that means. Congress has not spoken on the subject. 
 Congress’ power is probably not unbounded. The Court’s opinion in Baker v. Carr may 
have signaled that in the right case, the Court might interpret issues touching on this clause. 369 
U.S. 186, 208-32 (1962). See also Deborah Jones Merritt, The Guarantee Clause and State 
Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988) (arguing that the 
guarantee clause is a judicially enforceable limit on federal power). The Supreme Court has 
suggested, based on Merritt’s argument, that the clause might limit Congress’ power to regulate 
state activities and would, in those cases, be justiciable. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 
(1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991). 
 137In fact, the Supreme Court has noted that this issue is a matter of state constitutional 
law. 
Whether the legislative, executive, and judicial powers of a state shall be kept 
altogether distinct and separate, or whether persons or collections of persons 
belonging to one department may, in respect to some matters, exert powers 
which, strictly speaking, pertain to another department of government, is for the 
determination of the State. 
Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 84 (1902); see also Risser v. Thompson, 930 F.2d 549, 552 (7th 
Cir. 1991) (holding that the states need not have the same separation of powers limitations as the 
federal government); G. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 3 (1998); 
Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1884-86; James A. Gardner, State Courts as Agents of Federalism: 
give the judicial branch a much broader role in government than that possessed by 
the federal judicial branch.138 For example, state courts are not bound by Article 
III’s justiciability doctrines and, in fact, often share a policymaking role with the 
legislative branch.139 Conversely, in some instances, state courts have a narrower 
role in government than does the federal judicial branch.140 Thus, separation of 
powers operates quite differently at the state level, and among the states, from 
how it operates at the federal level,141 but it remains an issue of state 
constitutional law. 
 Federal separation of powers doctrine limits the power of the federal 
courts to strike down federal legislation on the ground that unelected judges 
should not be given the chance to frustrate the will of the majority except in a few 
instances.142 In every case involving legislation, there is a chance that the court 
 
Power and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1725, 1744-46 
(2003).  The federal courts lack jurisdiction to determine whether state actions violate the state’s 
constitution.  Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 392 (1798). 
 138Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1844-76; Hans A. Linde, The State and the Federal 
Courts in Governance, Vive La Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273, 1273-79 (2005). 
 139Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1861-68. 
 140See Jim Rossi, Dual Constitutions and Constitutional Duels: Separation of Powers and 
State Implementation of Federally Inspired Regulatory Programs and Standards, 46 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 1343, 1359-62, 1375-70 (2005) (discussing the strong nondelegation principle in 
state constitutional law and other differences in organization of state powers). 
 141Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1882-98; see Stanley H. Friedelbaum, State Courts and 
Separation of Powers: A Venerable Doctrine in Varied Contexts, 61 ALB. L. REV. 1417, 1458-59 
(1998) (suggesting that separation of powers is becoming more meaningful in the states); see also 
Robert A. Schapiro, Contingency and Universalism in State Separation of Powers Discourse, 4
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 79, 88-94, 99-107 (1998) (describing ways that states routinely 
adopt federal separation of powers concepts even though they do not have to and such adoption 
may not be appropriate). 
 142REDISH, supra note 10, at 5, 17-19; Martin H. Redish, Federal Judicial Independence: 
could frustrate the will of the majority. It is easy to see that when a court strikes 
down legislation as unconstitutional, the court is countering the will of the 
majority, but that is only the tip of the countermajoritarian iceberg. Every time a 
court is asked to interpret legislation it risks frustrating the will of the majority 
because the court might come to a meaning different from what the majority of 
legislators thought they had intended.143 Similarly, even where the court has 
interpreted the statute “correctly,” the court might apply the statute to reach a 
conclusion different from that a majority of legislators would have reached. Thus, 
every interaction between the federal courts and a legislative enactment brings 
with it an inherent risk of contermajoritarian action.144 Because of this risk, many 
 
Constitutional and Political Perspectives, 46 MERCER L. REV. 697, 707-08 (1995).  As the 
Supreme Court has said,  
federal courts may exercise power only “in the last resort, and as a necessity,” 
and only when adjudication is “consistent with a system of separated powers and 
[the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the 
judicial process.” 
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (alteration in original) (putting the separation of powers 
principle in the context of justiciability and quoting Chicago & Grand Trunk R. Co. v. Wellman, 
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)).  
 143Evidence of this phenomenon can be seen where Congress has amended statutes in 
response to interpretations it did not agree with.  E.g. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102-166 
§2(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (finding that the Supreme Court’s decision in Wards Cove v. Atonio,
490 U.S. 642 (1989) was not an accurate interpretation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964). 
 144Part of this difficulty lies in the nature of statutory interpretation. How is it possible to 
assign a single meaning to a complex collection of words put together by a number of different 
actors, subject to differing influences, through an interactive process designed to frustrate the 
exercise of power? The elusive nature of statutory interpretation and how courts should engage in 
it has been debated by many. Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: The Revival of 
Theory in Statutory Interpretation, 77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 252-54 (1992) (describing the views of 
Judges Posner and Easterbrook in the Seventh Circuit, and Justice Scalia, the three most 
prominent voices in the current statutory interpretation debate). For more on the debate between 
Judge Posner, on the one hand, and Judge Easterbrook and Justice Scalia on the other, compare 
United States v. Marshall, 908 F.2d 1312 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (Easterbrook, J.) with id. at 
1331-38 (Posner, J., dissenting); see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 275 
scholars contend that the federal courts should intervene only where intervention 
is necessary to protect the political minority from a tyranny of the majority.145 
The countermajoritarian concern is not as warranted for many states, and 
thus the state court powers need not be quite so limited. Many states elect their 
judges, who may then, because they are more accountable to the electorate than 
appointed judges, pose less of a danger of frustrating the majority to the extent 
that they create a tyranny of the minority.146 Even unelected state judges may pose 
less of a countermajoritarian difficulty for state law issues, arguably, than do 
 
(1990) (discussing whether an objective method of statutory interpretation is possible); ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION 23-29 (1997); Frank H. Easterbrook, Statute’s Domains,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533 (1983) (rejecting the notion that legislative bodies can have “intents”). For 
an alternate view of statutory interpretation, see e.g. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC 
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 38-47 (1994) (describing and criticizing overreliance on the text to 
the exclusion of other interpretive tools). 
 145E.g. STEPHEN P. POWERS & STANLEY ROTHMAN, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH?: 
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM (2002) (criticizing recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
both in constitutional and statutory interpretation); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 
4-9 (1980) (describing the underlying theory of the constitution as grounded in the notion of 
government by the majority); ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE 
SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962) (arguing that the judicial power could be 
dangerous in this way, but that the institutional limits the Court puts on itself guard against the 
worst dangers); Redish, supra note 142, at 707-08 (describing the countermajoritarian difficulty). 
But see Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the 
Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 425, 500 (1989) (suggesting that courts might have a 
role in defining public policy). 
 146Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1887 (citing HENRY J. ABRAHAM, THE JUDICIAL 
PROCESS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES, ENGLAND, AND 
FRANCE 21 (7th ed. 1998); Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by 
Correcting the Excessive Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397, 414 (1999)); 
Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The Limits of Federal Rationality 
Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1158-60 (1999). Of course, those judges may be ill-equipped to 
prevent tyrannies by the majority, but that is an entirely separate issue being debated in states 
across the country. Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1887 (citing DENNIS C. MUELLER,
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY 288 (1996); Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: 
Elective Judiciaries and the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 726-28 (1995)); Hershkoff, 
supra, at 1160-61. 
federal judges for state or federal law issues. State judges may feel closer to their 
communities than do federal judges simply by virtue of the fact that state districts 
are smaller.147 Additionally, as a part of state government, state judges may feel 
more bound to that smaller community of people and be more active in other 
ways in it.148 As a result, they may be more likely to know what the will of the 
representative branches is and what remedies are expected within the state.  
 This closeness is especially salient for statutory interpretation; state judges 
are more likely than their federal counterparts are to know what the issues of 
public debate were when state legislation was proposed, what the state legislature 
thought it was doing when it passed legislation, and what the situation in the state 
was before and after that legislation was passed.  That may be less true at the trial 
level where the districts are within a state’s boundaries, but would apply with 
some force at the appellate level.  Certainly, there is little to suggest that the 
United States Supreme Court is in a better position than any state court to 
understand why the state legislature thought that particular legislation was 
needed. 
 State courts also have more flexibility to respond to local concerns than do 
federal courts because the state court decisions are not as far-reaching, and as a 
result, may be viewed as more democratically legitimate.149 Thus, the state 
 
147See Id. at 1887 (citing Donald W. Brodie & Hans A. Linde, State Court Review of 
Administrative Action: Prescribing the Scope of Review, 1977 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 537, 542). 
 148Lawrence G. Sager, Foreward: State Courts and the Strategic Space between the 
Norms and Rules of Constitutional Law, 63 TEX. L. REV. 959 (1985). 
 149Hershkoff, supra note 132, at 1887, 1902 (quoting Burt Neuborne, Toward Procedural 
Parity in Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 725, 732 (1981)); Burt Neuborne, 
Foreward: State Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 899 
(1989). This flexibility, however, might limit state judges’ use of politically unpopular remedies 
judicial branch need not be restrained in the same way that the federal judicial 
branch has restrained itself. 
 Apart from the concerns about the accountability of institutions, federal 
separation of powers theory seeks to take advantage of a different kind of 
institutional competence: a faith in a functional division of labor.150 The federal 
elected branches are better equipped than are the federal courts to create national 
policy, and were designed that way to develop expertise in that type of policy 
making..151 Conversely, the federal courts are more competent to adjudicate 
disputes among parties and to say what legislation means or how it applies to the 
world.152 Coupled with this separation of functions is the notion that the federal 
government is one of limited jurisdiction, so that the judicial power of the federal 
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courts is thought to be rather narrow.153 
The function of state courts, on the other hand, are not limited in this way. 
First, they are courts of general jurisdiction, and therefore are viewed as having 
broader inherent powers than those of the federal courts.154 For example, the state 
courts have always engaged in common law lawmaking, while the federal courts 
are though to be able to create common law only in limited circumstances.155 
Additionally, many state constitutions give the state judicial branch a broad 
responsibility to help make state policy or exercise administrative power, either 
explicitly or through provisions that grant positive rights to individuals.156 
Additionally, state legislative and executive branches are not necessarily 
organized the same way with the same power as their federal counterparts, which 
lessens their special expertise or democratic responsiveness.157 And finally, many 
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states have mechanisms for direct, rather than representative democracy,158 which 
some commentators suggest necessitates greater state court vigilance to protect 
against tyrannies of the majority made possible by a less deliberative form of law 
making.159 Based on the different institutional competency of the state courts and 
the state representative branches, there is little reason to assume that state 
separation of powers must play out the same way as in the federal system.160 
Because the issue of state separation of powers is fundamentally a matter 
of state constitutional law, then, the federal courts should leave that balance to the 
states as a unitary entity.  Where the state court has interpreted a state statute, its 
very exercise of interpretation struck a particular balance.  Even if the state court 
exceeded its powers under the state constitution, the issue is one that should be 
left to the states to sort out.  The federal courts, even if they have to power to do 
so, should not intervene.  Therefore, the federal courts should defer to the balance 
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struck by the state courts and accept the interpretation offered by the state court in 
an exercise of that balance unless there is an important federal interest that would 
conflict with that deference.161 
IV. TO DEFER OR NOT 
Given the starting point that the primacy of a branch of government is a 
matter of state constitutional law to be struck by the states, the inquiry necessarily 
must turn to an exploration of what interest might be sufficient to warrant not 
deferring to the state judicial branch once it has struck a balance and interpreted 
state law. That reason would seem to have to be a relatively strong one that 
promotes sovereignty of some substantive federal interest.  
 The most compelling reason to not defer would be in a circumstance in 
which the federal court has a reason to suspect that the state court is working to 
frustrate a federal right or a federal interest.162 For example, where the state court 
deviated from prior state law in a way that violated due process, as the Supreme 
Court found had happened in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson163 and Bouie v. 
City of Columbia,164 the federal court would have a constitutional duty to 
intervene. In this way, state courts might interpret state law in a way to frustrate 
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review by federal courts and frustrate enforcement of important federal rights.165 
Conversely, the most compelling reason to defer would be where the state law 
issue was truly discrete from any federal issue, such that no federal interest could 
be said to be at stake. 
 Short of these situations, deciding whether to defer is much more difficult. 
The vast majority of state action is reviewed under a standard that is designed to 
be quite deferential: rational basis review.166 In fact, rational basis review is so 
deferential that some commentators have suggested that it is not review, but is 
instead the absence of review, the refusal to commit judicial resources to subjects 
outside of core constitutional concerns.167 Rational basis review does not enforce 
any substantive right or enumerated power.168 Rather it is a way to limit the 
countermajoritarian power of Article III judges.169 Thus, rational basis review 
embodies a policy of deference to the federal legislative branch, and it embodies a 
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policy of deference to the states.  But the rational basis test does not enforce any 
positive Constitutional delegation of power to the state legislative branch that 
would justify not treating the states as unitary entities. 
 And so, on the one hand, it is easy to see why, in exercising rational basis 
review, the federal courts reflexively defer to the legislative branch, any 
legislative branch, at the expense of any gloss a court has put on the law, as a 
function of accepted notions of federal institutional competence. But as explained 
above, assessing institutional competence at the state level is not for the federal 
courts to address in most instances.170 The question of institutional competence is 
a matter of state constitutional law in the first instance, a question more properly 
dealt with by state courts under the Supreme Court’s notions of dual 
federalism.171 Thus, without some substantive federal interest to enforce, the 
federal courts have no good reason not to defer to state court interpretations of 
state law. 
 One could argue that the federal interest at stake is in uniformity, that the 
rational basis test must mean the same things everywhere that it is applied.172 
Uniformity is an important federal interest, but only when it serves to protect 
federal sovereignty. If the federal government has no sovereignty interest, then it 
has no interest in uniformity. To say otherwise would take us to the world 
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envisioned by the Supreme Court in Swift v. Tyson,173 where the development of 
common law by the federal courts spread uniform common law throughout the 
country for the sake of uniformity alone. Going there is certainly a choice we 
could make as a society, but we have not made it, and in fact the Supreme Court 
specifically rejected it in Erie.174 Without a substantive federal interest enforced 
by the rational basis test, it is difficult to see why the federal courts should 
exercise independent judgment on an issue of state law any time a state court has 
spoken. 
 At the opposite end of the review spectrum, where a fundamental right is 
at stake, or a suspect class affected, the federal constitutional test to apply would 
be strict scrutiny. Strict scrutiny, unlike rational basis review, is employed to 
enforce substantive federal constitutional values, those of equality and liberty. 
The Fourteenth Amendment represents a fundamental shift of power to protect 
individual rights away from the states and to the federal government.175 Individual 
rights to liberty and equality are at stake even where strict scrutiny is not 
employed, as well, and the Fourteenth Amendment places vindication of those 
rights is primarily in the federal government.176 So perhaps the proper touchstone 
here is simply whether a liberty or equality issue is at stake. If so, the federal 
courts have an interest that warrants exercising independent review, not deferring 
to at least some state court interpretations.  
 Certainly, there are reasons to defer even here, however. For example, 
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allowing states to interpret their laws narrowly so as to avoid federal 
constitutional questions strengthens the quality of state government by allowing 
the state judicial branch to participate in enforcing the federal constitution. It also 
limits extending constitutional principles without a solid foundation. And so, the 
federal courts, it would seem, have stronger reasons both to defer and not to defer, 
depending on the state law issue, in the strict scrutiny context. 
 In either context, where the state court is overprotecting a federal interest 
or underprotecting a state interest, it is difficult to see what federalism value is 
promoted by failing to defer to the state court interpretation of state law.177 One 
argument for not deferring could be that if states wish to deviate from the federal 
model, they should do so by grounding decisions in their own constitutions, rather 
than by relying on federal constitutional principles. In other words, let the states 
be politically accountable for their decisions rather than suggesting that the 
federal government is responsible.  
 By not allowing state courts to shift responsibility, the federal courts may 
enhance political responsibility in a more positive way, as well. States and 
localities are given the chance to use the state political process to remedy 
constitutional violations, which may give those remedies greater credibility with 
the people of the state, which in turn should make those remedies more 
effective.178 Not only does the chance for democratic resolution enhance the 
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effectiveness of the remedy, but so does the fact that the remedy is chosen by 
insiders rather than seen as imposed from outside.179 Experimentation by state 
legislatures may lead to a greater ability for the states to innovate on ways to 
remedy constitutional problems.180 That innovation benefits us all.181 This state 
innovation, however, might be achieved by ensuring a strong role for the state 
judiciary, regardless of whether the constitutional limit the state courts rely on is 
federal or state. 
 This inquiry has implications far beyond the meaning or purpose the state 
courts find, as well. The state courts’ processes necessarily impact the deference 
equation. For example, for a brief period of time the Connecticut Supreme Court 
adopted a method of statutory interpretation that is different from the method used 
in the federal courts.182 That court held that it could use any contextual 
information to interpret the text of a statute even if that text was not ambiguous, 
contrary to what is called the “plain meaning rule,” which is used by the federal 
courts, and which allows a court to consult extratextual materials only when 
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statutory language is ambiguous.183 The method of statutory interpretation should 
be a matter negotiated between the states legislative and judicial branches, and not 
necessarily imposed from outside unless that method is somehow used to frustrate 
a substantive federal interest. Similarly, state choices about the amount of 
deference reviewing state courts give to lower state tribunals may differ from their 
federal counterparts. It is difficult to see how that decision implicates any 
substantive federal interest to warrant imposing the federal model on the states. 
Ultimately, a lack of deference could impact the states’ abilities to interpret the 
substantive provisions of their own constitutions where those constitutions mirror 
the language of the federal constitution, or perhaps even where similar rights are 
only mentioned. Even for those who argue against a dual federalism model, this 
result would encroach too far into state autonomy and sovereignty. 
 V. CONCLUSION 
The federal courts encounter state law issues in a great variety of ways 
with varying levels of state court interpretation attached. To date, the federal 
courts have treated the state courts sometimes as if they were lower federal courts 
and sometimes as if they were the courts of completely separate sovereigns 
without explaining why. While this lack of transparency gives the federal courts 
the greatest amount of discretion and power, it does little to support the legitimacy 
of the federal courts. This article has attempted to describe when the Supreme 
Court will defer and when not, and found that difference somewhat counter-
intuitive and in conflict with the Supreme Court’s notions of dual sovereignty. 
While dual sovereignty might be neither truly possible nor desirable in the age of 
the administrative state, it can provide some practical boundaries to divide the 
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labor of the courts in our federal system when they necessarily interact. Thus, this 
article has suggested that the federal courts defer to state courts unless an issue 
presents a substantive federal interest that warrants independent federal review. I 
hope that this provides some normative guidance that the courts could consider in 
negotiating those interactions. 
